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Public Sector Dispute Resolution. 
An American Twist to a Canadian Approach 
Allen Ponak 
The objective hère is to report on the expériences of the 
Spécial Committee on Collective Bargaining Impasses in 
Public Employment and to emphasize how the varions parties 
viewed the impasses procédures then in effect and what kinds 
of revisions they considered most désirable. 
Substantial variation exists within North America with respect to 
procédures adopted to résolve collective bargaining impasses in the 
public sector. This reflects to a large extent the continuing debate 
among public employées, public managers, and policy makers over the 
best way to deal with interest disputes involving government em-
ployées. ' 
In this light, récent developments in the state of Wisconsin are 
worth exploring. Wisconsin was the first state to grant collective 
bargaining rights to its public employées, having done so in 1959. In 
1974, in response to the increasing frequency of strikes in the public 
sector and one bitter work stoppage in particular, a tripartite committee 
of enquiry was appointed to investigate the efficacy of impasse reso-
lution mechanisms then in effect. The « Spécial Committee on Collective 
Bargaining Impasses in Public Employment»* as it was called, was 
given ten months to report its find-
ings and recommendations to the 
Wisconsin Législature.2 The Com-
mittee focused most of its attention 
PONAK, A., Assistant Professor of 
Industrial Relations, Faculty of Com-
merce, The University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, B. C. 
1
 The parameters of this debate are synthesized in: James L. STERN et al., 
Final Offer Arhitration (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Health and Company, 1975), p. 1. For 
a gênerai overview, see: George T. SULZNER, «The Impact of Impasse Procédures in 
Public Sector Labor: An Overview,» Journal of Collective Negotiations, Vol. 4 (1), 
1975, pp. 3-21. 
2
 1973 Assembly Joint Resolution 138 (Wisconsin State Législature: Madison, 
Wisconsin). 
* Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Industrial Relations 
Research Institute, Québec, P.Q., June 1976. The author likes to thank Chris FRASER 
and Stephen HILL for comments on an earlier draft, Howard SNYDER and Ian WILSON 
for their research assistance and the National Civil Service League (Washington, D.C.) 
which provided funds for portions of this research. Unless otherwise specified, it will 
be referred to simply as the Committee. 
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on Wisconsin's Municipal Employment Relations Act3 which governed 
collective bargaining for municipal employées and public school 
teachers.4 It was widely held that any revisions in this Act would later 
be applied to state employées as well. 
The objective of this paper is to report on the expériences of the 
Committee and to emphasize how the various parties viewed the 
impasse procédures then in effect and what kinds of revisions they 
considered most désirable. Ample opportunity was provided to assess 
thèse perceptions during four public hearings at which more than one 
hundred représentatives of unions and public employers testified. Of 
additional interest, especially to Canadians, was the attention given 
to the concept of a procédure that would permit the employée orga-
nization unilaterally to choose between binding arbitration and a strike 
in the event of an impasse. In récognition that this feature first was 
introduced under the Public Service Staff Relations Act,5 it was referred 
to as the « Canadian Plan. » The Committee ultimately did recommend 
a dispute resolution mechanism which incorporated a choice pïocedure, 
but one that constituted a significant departure from the Canadian ap-
proach and contained some unique innovations. 
Information on which this paper is based was obtained through 
Personal interviews with Committee members and other informed 
parties in Wisconsin, attendance at Committee sessions and public 
hearings, and from various documents and transcripts generated by 
the Committee. 
BACKGROUND 
More than a décade after the enactment of public sector collective 
bargaining législation, bargaining in Wisconsin at the municipal level and 
in éducation is very widespread. It is also a highly decentralized pro-
cess, collective agreements almost invariably being negotiated locally. 
At the time of the Committee's establishment several différent public 
sector bargaining statutes were in effect. The Municipal Employment 
Relations Act governed labour relations for municipal employées and 
teachers. State employées (or civil servants) were covered under 
3
 Wisconsin Statute 111.70, as amended. 
4
 Unlike the situation in Canada, municipal employées are covered by public 
sector labour législation, rather than private sector codes. 
5
 Canadian fédéral législation enacted in 1967 that governs labour relations 
in the fédéral civil service. 
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provisions of the State Employment Relations Act.6 Police and fire-
fighters had their own separate provisions.7 
Interest dispute resolution machinery under the Municipal Em-
ployment Relations Act consisted of a combination of médiation and 
fact finding procédures. Strikes statutorily were prohibited. As an 
initial step the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC),8 
on its own or at the request of one or both of the parties involved, 
was authorized to provide médiation to assist the parties in reaching a 
voluntary settlement. If médiation proved unsuccessful, either or both 
of the parties could pétition the WERC to begin fact finding procédures. 
A neutral party was appointed in most cases to serve as factfinder, 
although either party had the right to request a three-member tripartite 
panel. The factfinder (or panel) then conducted hearings to détermine 
the facts of the dispute and the positions of the parties. Upon completion 
of the hearings, the factfinder reported, in writing, the facts of the 
impasse and his recommendations for settlement to both parties and 
to the WERC. At any time prior to the issuance of the report, the 
factfinder could endeavour to résolve the dispute by médiation. 
Once the factfinder's report was released, each party was required 
to inform the other side and the Commission, within thirty days, 
whether it accepted or rejected, in whole or in part, the recommen-
dations for settlement. In order for the report to become binding, it 
was necessary that both sides accepted the recommendations. The 
rejection of the recommendations by either side exhausted the statutory 
impasse resolution procédures under the Act, in effect leaving the 
dispute unresolved. Negotiations might or might not then be resumed, 
and since it was illégal for the employées to strike, the old collective 
agreement, even if it had expired, remained in effect. 
State employées in Wisconsin fell under impasse resolution 
machinery essentially identical to those covering municipal employées 
and teachers. Police and firefighter interest disputes ultimately were 
resolved by binding arbitration, usually of the final offer sélection 
variety. (At no time was it contemplated that the Committee's rec-
ommendations would be applied to police or firefighter s.) 
6
 Wisconsin Statutes 111.80 and 111.97. 
7
 Wisconsin Statute 111.77. 
8
 The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission is the agency responsible 
for administering Wisconsin labour statutes. 
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The expérience in Wisconsin with thèse statutes with respect to 
their abilities to résolve impasses without stoppages is presented in 
Table 1. 
Thèse data show that public school teachers and municipal em-
ployées, both covered by the Municipal Employment Relations Act, 
hâve been most prone to strike. Table 1 also reveals the increasing 
incidence of strikes since 1969. 
In addition, as the number of strikes hâve increased, the utiliza-
tion of fact finding has decreased. In a study that examined the deve-
lopments in éducation, it was found that teachers had lost faith in fact 
finding and had become prone to forego it in favour of direct action.9 
TABLE 1 
Public Employée Strikes in Wisconsin per Year 
(1962 to 1974) 
Public 
School Law Other State 
Year Teachers Enforcement Firefighters Municipal Employées TOTAL 
1962 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1963 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1964 0 0 0 2 0 2 
1965 0 0 0 2 0 2 
1966 0 0 0 3 0 3 
1967 1 0 0 2 0 3 
1968 0 0 1 6 0 7 
1969 3 0 1 6 3 13 
1970 2 0 2 4 0 8 
1971 7 1 0 6 0 14 
1972 9 0 0 3 0 12 
1973 19 0 1 8 0 28 
1974 3 0 0 8 0 11 
(Jan.-June) 
TOTALS 44 1 5 52 3 105 
SOURCE: Compiled by the Wisconsin Législative Council from the records of the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. 
9
 Lucian B. GATEWOOD, «Factfinding in Teacher Disputes: The Wisconsin 
Expérience,» Monihly Labor Review, Vol. 97, No. 10, October 1974, pp. 47-51. 
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As is often the case, however, it was neither the increasing 
incidence of strikes, per se, nor the perceived ineffectiveness of fact 
finding by unions that occasioned the Committee's appointment. 
Rather it was the impact of an unusually bitter teacher's dispute in 1974, 
in the small Wisconsin community of Hortonville, which focused an 
almost unprecedented amount of attention on Wisconsin public sector 
labour relations, that was most responsible. 
The dispute originated when teachers in Hortonville and the 
Hortonville School Board were unable to reach agreement on a new 
contract after a long period of negotiations. The major issue was wages. 
Attempts to bring the parties together through médiation proved fruit-
less. A fact finder was appointed and handed down recommendations 
for settlement. The Board accepted his recommendations, but the 
teachers rejected them. 
With no further provision for intervention under the law, matters 
remained stalemated until the teachers began an illégal strike. The 
School Board subsequently fired the teachers on breach of contract 
grounds, successfully recruited new teachers, and reopened the schools. 
A week later police arrested more than fifty picketers who were protest-
ing the entrance and exit of substitute teachers in front of the local high 
school. The arrests, and some of the violent incidents that accompanied 
the arrests, received wide exposure.10 
The décision to form the Committee was taken in the aftermath 
of Hortonville. The Législature directed that a Committee be appoint-
ed to examine the whole matter of public sector impasse resolution in 
the state and to recommend changes in the législation directly involved, 
namely, the Municipal Employment Relations Act. 
A nineteen-member committee was appointed in May 1974. It was 
composed of eleven public members and eight members of the Wiscon-
sin Législature. Of the public members, three represented organized 
labour, five individuals represented public management, and three in-
dividuals were from academia and were not explicitly associated with 
either side. The chairman of the Committee was Arien Christenson, 
Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin. 
10
 This synopsis of events during the Hortonville dispute was prepared on the 
basis of newspaper accounts, an interview with the factfinder involved, and an unpublished 
report prepared by Mr. Howard SNYDER, formerly of the Milwaukee Teachers Education 
Association. 
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PUBLIC SECTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION — PERCEPTIONS OF EMPLOYERS, 
EMPLOYEES, AND NEUTRALS 
At its first meeting, the Committee voted unanimously to conduct 
several public hearings to ascertain the views of public employée 
groups, public employer groups, and other interested parties. Three 
public hearings subsequently were held prior to the commencement of 
any formai délibérations by the Committee. Notices announcing the 
hearings asked that two questions be addressed: 
1. What, if any, spécifie problems hâve been encountered in the 
présent impasse resolution procédures contained in Wisconsin's 
Employment Relations Act? 
2. What, if any, changes in the law would facilitate the peaceful 
settlement of collective bargaining impasses in public employ-
ment?1 1 
Approximately ninety percent of the oral and written testimony 
at the hearings was submitted by individuals associated with public 
employers or public employées, with the majority of thèse coming 
from persons in the éducation field.12 
Perceptions of Public Employers 
Public employers with few exceptions favoured rétention of the 
existing impasse procédures. It was argued both that the médiation and 
fact finding procédures worked well and that alternatives to it — name-
ly, granting public employées a right to strike, invoking binding arbi-
tration in the event of an impasse, or permitting the employée group 
to choose between the two — were unacceptable. In defending their 
arguments, public employers frequently cited their concern for the 
«public interest. » 
Legalization of strikes generally was attacked on three grounds: 
1) it would greatly increase the power of unions; 2) it would lead to 
an unacceptable increase in public employée work stoppages ; and 3) it 
would foster political strikes. Harsher penalties for illégal strikes and 
stricter enforcement of the strike ban were advocated. 
Opposition to compulsory arbitration was equally widespread and 
even more vigorous. Compulsory arbitration, the employers contended, 
11
 Wisconsin Législative Council, Notice of Public Hearing (Spécial Committee 
on Collective Bargaining Impasses on Public Employment). 
12
 Thèse figures were compilée! from transcripts of the public hearings. 
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would undermine the process of collective bargaining and, more 
significantly, would remove décision making authority from the persons 
(i.e. public management) in whom the taxpayers has vested authority. 
The employée relations director of a Wisconsin community summarized 
this sentiment when he stated: 
Compulsory arbitration would resuit in the total loss of the public's right 
through its elected représentatives to détermine the level of expenditures 
and proportion of its budget to be devoted to particular services within 
the community.I3 
Public employers expressed even greater opposition to the choice 
of procédures approach. In addition to embracing, de facto, the two 
dispute resolution mechanisms they explicitly opposed, the choice of 
procédures alternative was depicted as a method that would ensure that 
power in negotiations would be weighted heavily in favour of the 
unions. The following testimony from a municipal labour relations 
director (who then went on to state a préférence for the legalization of 
strikes) is indicative: 
We are opposed to the strike-arbitration option. The vestiture of an 
exclusive option with the union to détermine whether it will strike or utilize 
compulsory, final and binding arbitration in the event of a dispute does 
not «promote peaceful resolution of différences, nor reflect a balance 
of equity and fairness between the parties, nor does it promote continuity 
of essential services. » The effect of such an option arms the union with the 
ability to disrupt governmental services where their situation assessment 
indicates a strike would be successful and the ability to eliminate the 
influence of local elected officiais by compelling arbitration when they 
détermine a strike might not succeed. Under such circumstances the 
municipality would be at the distinct disadvantage of reacting to the 
décisions of the union.,4 
One other facet of the testimony by public employers is worth 
noting. A number of employers declared that if any major changes were 
made in the existing statute, they preferred legalizing strikes over either 
binding arbitration or the choice of procédures approach. They saw 
the former as being « the lesser of evils. » 
Perceptions of Public Employées 
The position taken by public employées was very différent from 
that enunciated by public employers. Public employées were almost 
unanimous in their contention that the Municipal Employment Relations 
13
 Testimony at first public hearing, July 25, 1974, held in Milwaukee, p. 53. 
14
 Testimony at third public hearing, September 30, 1974, in Madison, p. 27. 
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Act's impasse procédures did not work well and ought to be substantial-
ly revised. 
The paramount objection expressed by employées toward the 
existing procédure was that it lacked a mechanism that could provide 
for «ultimate définitive resolution of disputes. » It was argued again and 
again that the absence of a légal right to strike or of binding arbitration 
left many impasses unresolved after ail procédures under the law had 
been exhausted. The président of a local teacher association stated: 
If médiation fails, the only other alternative under the law is fact finding. 
What can a factfinder do?. . . in the end ail a factfinder can do is suggest 
a seulement. The results of the fact finding are not binding on either 
party. We hâve gone through fact finding three times in the last six years. 
In ail cases the board refused to accept the factfinder's report in its entirety. 
If médiation and fact finding do not succeed, and in our case they hâve 
not, what is left? There are no other alternatives within the law. , s 
The existing procédures were further criticized on the grounds that the 
lack of finality placed no pressure on employers to bargain in good faith 
and enabled them to drag out negotiations to the détriment of em-
ployées. 
In view of thèse complaints, changes in the law were strongly 
and universally advocated. As a start, a right to strike was demanded. 
Collective bargaining did not function properly in the absence of the 
strike sanction, it was argued, because there was no incentive for the 
employers to make concessions. On philosophical grounds, it was 
argued that the déniai of the right to strike had no place in a free society. 
However, employées did not, in the main, désire a simple right to 
strike. Rather they favoured a procédure that would enable the em-
ployée organization unilaterally to choose, at the point of impasse, 
between binding arbitration or a strike. Public employées rnaintained 
that this type of procédure, rather than the simple right to strike, would 
be most likely to equalize bargaining power between themselves and 
public management throughout the state. Smaller rural units who lacked 
the muscle to strike, it was suggested, would be able to opt for arbi-
tration, while larger urban units could sélect the strike route. In this 
way, the argument ran, collective bargaining could take place meaning-
fully. 
15
 Testimony at first public hearing, July 25, 1974, in Milwaukee, p. 45. 
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Perceptions of Individual Committee Members 
The opinions of the individual Committee members reflected the 
tripartite nature of the Committee. The partisan appointées echoed the 
views expressed by their respective factions at the public hearings. 
Union représentatives on the Committee were critical of the existing 
procédures and advocated major revisions. The employer représen-
tatives, for their part, reiterated their basic satisfaction with the current 
statute and advised against tampering with its dispute seulement 
provisions. 
The attitudes of the non-partisan16 Committee members are 
more revealing and, as well, more important since it was they who 
held the balance of power on the Committee. 
Contrary to union claims, it was generally agreed that the law 
worked reasonably well and that most disputes were settled with few 
difficultés. More significantly, however, the belief also was expressed 
that the employer was the more powerful party under the législation, 
a serious problem when an employer chose not to bargain in good faith. 
One non-partisan observed that «under the law, the employer does not 
really hâve to bargain in good faith, since there is nothing to compel 
him to do so. » Elaborating on this thème, another non-partisan member 
of the Committee stated «that under the existing procédures, collective 
bargaining is pretty much what the employers want to give employ-
ées. »17 
In light of this sentiment, it is not surprising that nine of the eleven 
non-partisans voted in favour of a motion supporting substantial change 
in the impasse resolution mechanism then in effect.18 But spécifie 
suggestions for revision varied among this group and the final Committee 
recommendations, as is discussed below, reflected considérable com-
promise. 
16
 «Non-partisan» is used only to distinguish the group of Committee members 
representing neither labour nor management. The term is not intended to reflect any value 
judgments on the part of the author. 
17
 This quotation and the one directly preceding it in the text were noted during 
interviews held with individual members of the Committee. 
Ix
 At the December 18, 1974 session of the Committee, it was moved that a vote 
be taken on the issue of whether Committee members wanted any change in the existing 
statute. A «yes» vote indicated the position that the existing collective bargaining law 
required substantial change. A «no» vote indicated that no change was required. (From 
minutes of December 18, 1974 meeting of the Committee.) 
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Summary 
The most striking observation that can be made about the opinions 
expressed by public employers, on one hand, and public employées, 
on the other, concerns the great disagreement between them. Union 
représentatives were highly critical of the existing dispute resolution 
machinery and advocated its replacement by a procédure (the 
«Canadian Plan») completely disagreeable to public employers. The 
employer spokespersons, conversely, overwhelmingly endorsed the 
soundness of existing procédures and argued vigorously against any 
substantive revisions. The magnitude of thèse différences is detailed in 
Table 2. 
It was the non-partisan members of the Committee, therefore, who 
ultimately were required to set the parameters of the eventual recom-
mendations to the Législature. While agreeing with employers that the 
existing statute was adéquate in most instances, they also accepted 
the union argument that the impasse procédures were balanced in the 
favour of employers. The non-partisan Committee members thus sought 
alternatives that would redress this balance somewhat. 
THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the search for an alternative that could accommodate the 
diverse concerns of a majority of the Committee members, a wide 
variety of ideas were explored. In addition to the suggestions enunciated 
at the public hearings, the Committee reviewed impasse procédures 
utilized in various states, municipalities, and in Canada. Little progress 
was made, however, until the Committee considered ten impasse 
resolution «procédural models,» prepared by the Committee's staff 
attorney, which incorporated a broad spectrum of dispute resolution 
techniques.19 Not patterned explicitly after any particular statute, the 
models were « intended solely to place a number of concepts and ideas 
before the Committee within several overall procédural frameworks 
which, in turn, could be further refined into viable statutory language. 
Many of the provisions in ail of the models... could be 'mixed and 
matched' with other provisions from différent models to create a 
potentially workable statutory impasse resolution procédure.»20 
19
 Working paper prepared by Committee Staff Attorney, December 12, 1974. 
20
 Quoted from explanatory comments that accompanied working paper on 
collective bargaining impasse resolution models. Thèse comments were prepared by the 
Committee's Staff Attorney. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Public Employer and Public Employée Testimony 
on Preferred Impasse Resolution Procédure 
Preferred Impasse Procédure Employers (%) Employées (%) 
Right to Strike 7% 21% 
Compulsory Arbitration 2 8 
Choice of Procéduresa 0 71 
Médiation and Fact Finding 
(No right to strike/no 
compulsory arbitration) 91 0 
Percentages listed in this table are based on the testimony of 68 public employers and 
24 public employée groups (or their respective représentatives). 
a
. Choice of procédures is intended to connote an impasse resolution procédure 
under which the union unilaterally could choose between binding arbitration or a légal 
strike. 
SOURCE: This table is based on an analysis of transcripts of testimony at the fîrst 
three public hearings conducted by the Wisconsin Spécial Committee on 
Collective Bargaining Impasses in Public Employaient. 
The «mixing and matching,» in fact, is precisely what took place. 
With the procédural models serving as the point of departure for 
discussion, three draft proposais were formulated. Two of the three 
proposais, however, represented minority viewpoints and never were 
considered seriously.21 The third alternative, on the other hand, reflect-
ed the main currents of thought of the non-partisan members of the 
Committee and ultimately was adopted as the Committee's recom-
mendation. 
The proposai introduced a modified choice of procédures approach 
in which either final offer binding arbitration or a strike would constitute 
the terminal method of dispute resolution. At the point at which a final 
impasse was declared (by the WERC), each side in the dispute would 
hâve an opportunity to choose between arbitration or a légal strike. If 
both parties chose not to submit the dispute to arbitration, the employée 
organization would be permitted to legally strike. If either one of the 
parties in the dispute opted for arbitration, both sides would be required 
to submit to the arbitration. Under the latter circumstances, the em-
ployées right to strike would be suspended. In other words, the right 
21
 The two proposais were referred to as WLCS: 76/5 and WLCS: 91/2. The 
former called for non-binding intervention in the event of an impasse and was in many 
ways similar to the existing statute. The latter proposai was a binding arbitration bill. 
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of public employées to strike formally was recognized, but its exercise 
was permitted only under specially prescribed conditions, the key 
contingency being that both sides explicitly declined to make use of 
binding arbitration. The proposai also included provisions for médiation 
and non-binding fact flnding at earlier stages of negotiations.22 
Before the proposai was adopted, a fourth public hearing was 
held to solicit reactions to it. As in the first three hearings., public 
employers and public employées differed greatly in their assessments 
of the issues. 
Public employers completely opposed the proposai, reaffirming 
again their antipathy to binding arbitration and legalized strikes. Predict-
ing the worst, they foresaw widespread reliance on both arbitration 
and strikes if the proposai was enacted. Further, they argued that in 
view of the oft stated répugnance of public employers toward binding 
third party solutions, it was inévitable that the unions, in practice, would 
be the side that exercised the choice of invoking arbitration or opting 
for the strike route. They thus saw the union side as the prime benefi-
ciary of the choice of procédures feature of the proposai.23 
Public employées were far less critical of the proposai even though 
they saw it as unnecessarily curtailing their right to strike. They did 
not seem to feel, as did public management, that the union invariably 
would control whether binding arbitration or the strike route was 
invoked. The most positive aspect of the bill, from the public em-
ployées' perspective, was its spécification of a clearcut terminal point 
in the bargaining process and its récognition, however limited, of the 
right of government employées in Wisconsin to engage in strikes. 
Overall, the gênerai sentiment among union représentatives was that 
the proposai did not go far enough, but that it was a step in the right 
direction and certainly was préférable to the procédures it was designed 
to replace. They predicted that because the proposai injected the 
concept of finality into bargaining, it would reduce, rather than increase, 
the total number of interest impasses.24 
At the final Committee session, the proposai was passed as out-
lined. Voting for the bill were the three labour représentatives, the three 
Committee members from academia, and five members of the Légis-
lature. Voting against adoption of the proposai were the five employer 
22
 Draft proposai WLCS; 90/3. 
23
 Testimony from fourth public hearing, February 17, 1975, in Madison. 
24
 Ibid. 
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représentatives and three members of the Législature. Underlining the 
sentiment of those (including himself) who had voted for the proposai, 
the Committee chairman stated that it was as idéal a recommendation 
as possible given the social and political context within which it would 
operate.25 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The recently concluded proceedings in Wisconsin hâve impli-
cations in several areas. Looking fîrst at the attitudes expressed by 
the two major protaganists, it is clear that after more than a décade of 
collective bargaining, fundamental différences exist between the public 
employers of Wisconsin and the state's public employées. This may 
be partly explainable by the lingering bitterness of the Hortonville 
dispute, but évidence of deeper mistrust emerged. In particular, the 
extent to which the public employers really had accepted the process 
of collective bargaining can be questioned. Throughout the testimony, 
and in interviews, the concept of sovereignty repeatedly was raised in 
one form or another. Strikes, binding arbitration, or any process for that 
matter that might force public management to make unwanted con-
cessions were depicted as illegitimately removing authority from the 
persons in whom it had been properly invested. 
How indicative are thèse findings of attitudes held elsewhere? 
Conventional wisdom holds that with the passage of time the parties 
to a collective bargaining relationship undergo a maturing process that 
reduces the level of conflict between them. Hope is held that as unions 
and management in the public sector gain expérience with collective 
bargaining, the degree of unrest that has characterized the formative 
years will décline. But for Wisconsin, at least, the findings in this study 
would seem to belie the underlying assumption of this proposition. It 
is relevant to ask if public managers in other jurisdictions also perceive 
unions as sources of illegitimate usurpation of décision making author-
ity. Where unions sensé that this is the case, how do they respond? 
What impact might attitudes of this nature be exercising on the incidence 
of work stoppages? Do certain methods of dispute resolution exacerbate 
underlying tensions, and conversely, do certain impasse procédures 
reduce them ? Given the paucity of empirical data addressed to answer-
ing thèse questions, this would appear to be a useful and fruitful area 
for research. 
25
 Thèse comments were made during an interview held with the Committee 
chairman. 
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Perceptions held toward the «Canadian approach» also merit 
some exploration. It is obvious that only selected aspects of the choice 
of procédures method hâve been exported. The Canadian plan accurate-
ly was perceived as one that permits the union to choose between 
arbitration or the right to strike in the event of an impasse. But nuances 
of the Public Service Staff Relations Act such as designating essential 
employées and stipulating that the employée organization must choose 
its procédure prior to the start of negotiations seem to hâve been de-
emphasized. Both public employées and public employers appeared 
to take for granted the fact that the sélection of procédures would occur 
at the point of impasse rather than prior to negotiations. This constitutes 
an altération of significant proportions and it is little wonder that under 
thèse circumstances the choice of procédures approach was viewed 
by ail concerned as favouring the union side. In this regard, it is interest-
ing to note that the question of when to specify the impasse procédure 
was an issue both when the P.S.S.R.A. first was being considered26 
and more recently in Jacob Finkleman's report on proposais for lég-
islative changes in that Act.27 Canadian union représentatives, like 
Wisconsin unionists, advocated that the choice of dispute resolution 
mechanisms be made at the point of impasse. 
Finally, future developments in Wisconsin under the proposed 
statute deserve scrutiny. The recommendations make the décision over 
impasse procédures a bilatéral one — as opposed to a unilatéral one by 
the union as in Canada — and ensure that in the event the two parties 
disagree over whether the strike option or arbitration option should be 
invoked, binding arbitration would take precedence. Choices over the 
procédures would be made at the point of impasse and arbitration would 
be of the final offer sélection variety. This dispute resolution mechanism 
is unique and it will be especially interesting to see how public em-
ployers respond when they hâve an opportunity to choose between 
binding arbitration or a strike. In their testimony, public employers 
indicated that they would rather take a strike than submit to outside 
binding intervention. The proposed procédure will provide many oppor-
tunités to test the validity of this assertion. 
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PUBLIC SFCTOR DISPUTF RFSOLUTION 551 
One final note on the current status of the bill. As this paper is 
being completed, the Committee's recommendations are awaiting the 
opening of the forthcoming Législative session. It is difficult to predict 
at this stage when the proposai will be enacted. 
La solution des conflits dans le secteur public: 
Le tour de main américain et la méthode canadienne 
Il existe bien des variantes en Amérique du Nord dans les mécanismes mis au 
point pour résoudre les différends du travail dans le secteur public. Dans une certaine 
mesure, ce phénomène traduit le débat ininterrompu qui se poursuit pour découvrir les 
meilleures méthodes pour résoudre les conflits d'intérêts entre les gouvernements et leurs 
employés. 
Sur ce point, il vaut la peine d'étudier ce qui s'est fait récemment dans l'État 
du Wisconsin. Le Winsconsin fut le premier État à accorder à ses employés le droit de 
négociation collective en 1959. 
En 1974, pour mettre un terme à la fréquence de plus en plus marquée des grè-
ves dans le secteur public, une commission d'enquête tripartite a été formée pour étu-
dier l'efficacité des mécanismes de règlement des différends. Ces mécanismes consis-
taient dans le recours à la fois à la médiation et aux enquêtes factuelles, alors que la 
grève était interdite par la loi. 
Quatre auditions publiques eurent lieu auxquelles plus d'une centaine de repré-
sentants de syndicats et d'employeurs du secteur public furent entendus* Les repré-
sentants des syndicats critiquèrent durement le système de médiation et les enquêtes 
factuelles qui n'étaient pas, selon eux, valables «pour assurer la solution finale des dif-
férends.» Au départ, ils demandèrent la légalisation du droit de grève. Toutefois, les 
employés du secteur public ne voulaient pas surtout le simple droit de faire la grève. 
Ils favorisaient plutôt un système qui permettrait unilatéralement aux syndicats de 
choisir, à un certain moment de l'impasse, entre l'arbitrage exécutoire ou le droit de 
grève. 
Lorsque ce système fut inséré dans la Loi des relations de travail dans les ser-
vices publics (Public Service Staff Relations Act), on s'y référa sous le nom de «pro-
jet canadien». 
De leur côté, les porte-parole des employeurs préconisaient le maintien du 
régime existant et se félicitaient de sa valeur. Ils s'opposaient avec vigueur à toute révi-
sion substantielle de la législation. Ils soutinrent que le mécanisme de médiation et 
d'enquête factuelle fonctionnait bien et que les contre-propositions, soit le droit de 
grève, le recours à l'arbitrage exécutoire en cas d'impasse et la liberté pour les em-
ployés de choisir entre les deux, étaient des solutions inacceptables. Fait à noter, un 
certain nombre d'employeurs déclarèrent que, si l'on était pour apporter des change-
ments majeurs à la législation existante, ils préféraient purement et simplement la léga-
lisation des grèves à un régime qui laissait la possibilité de choisir entre la grève et 
l'arbitrage exécutoire. Ils voyaient dans la grève «un moindre mal.» 
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Plaçant l'intérêt public à la base de ses préoccupations, la commission recom-
manda finalement un système qui laissait le choix entre l'arbitrage et la grève, mais y 
ajoutait une innovation importante. Arrivées au point où la situation deviendrait sans 
issue, chacune des parties au différend pourrait choisir entre l'arbitrage et une grève 
qui serait légale. 
Si les deux parties choisissaient de ne pas soumettre le différend à l'arbitrage, 
il serait permis au syndicat de déclencher une grève légale. Si l'une ou l'autre des 
parties optait pour l'arbitrage, les deux devraient accepter de soumettre le différend à 
l'arbitrage. En ce dernier cas, le droit de grève des employés se trouverait suspendu. 
En d'autres termes, la recommandation de la commission d'enquête faisait de la déci-
sion sur la procédure à suivre une affaire bilatérale contrairement à la décision uni-
latérale du syndicat que l'on trouve dans la législation canadienne. 
Elle recommandait aussi que, dans l'éventualité où les deux parties seraient en 
désaccord sur l'option à choisir, soit la grève, soit l'arbitrage, l'arbitrage exécutoire 
aurait préséance. De plus, on proposait que l'arbitrage portât sur les dernières offres 
finales. 
Ce mécanisme de solution des conflits est unique et il sera fort intéressant de 
voir comment les employeurs des services publics agiront lorsqu'ils auront à faire le 
choix entre l'arbitrage exécutoire ou une grève. Dans leurs témoignages, les em-
ployeurs du secteur public ont soutenu qu'ils préféreraient courir le risque de la grève 
plutôt que de se soumettre à une intervention exécutoire de l'extérieur. Le système qui 
a été proposé fournira maintes occasions de vérifier la véracité d'une pareille affirmation. 
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